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Why did policymakers adopt the gold standard? Although previous research has identified ex post
effects of gold standard adoption on trade and bond yields, few studies have sought to understand whether
these were the actual outcomes of interest to policymakers at the time of adoption. We examine the
political economy of Japan’s adoption of the gold standard in 1897 by exploring the ex ante motives
of policymakers as well as how the legislative decision to adopt gold won approval. We then link the
beliefs of contemporaneous policymakers to data so that we can test the economic effects of adoption.
In contrast to previous studies examining bond yields, we find little evidence that joining the gold
standard reduced Japan’s country risk or investors anticipated a dramatic decline in borrowing rates
for the government. Moreover, we find no evidence of a domestic investment boom or that investors
anticipated one and bid it into stock prices. However, as some policymakers suggested, we find that
membership in the gold standard increased Japan’s exports by lowering transactions costs and because
the price of gold fell relative to silver, making exports to silver standard countries more competitive.
While Japan also received a boost in exports to its regional trading partners when it switched from
paper to silver, going onto gold allowed Japan to tap into the growing share of global trade that was
centered on the gold standard: by the late 1890s nearly 60 percent of Japanese exports and total trade
were with members of the gold club.
Kris James Mitchener
Department of Economics
Leavey School of Business
Santa Clara University










Robert Day School of Economics and Finance
Claremont McKenna College
500 East Ninth Street
Claremont, CA 91711
and NBER
marc_weidenmier@claremontmckenna.edu1   
 
 
Why did Countries Adopt the Gold Standard? 
Lessons from Japan 
 
 
Why did countries join the gold standard? Recent research in economic history has generally 
focused on two explanations. Bordo and Rockoff (1996) argue that adherence to the monetary rule was “a 
good housekeeping seal of approval,” which signaled to international capital markets that countries were 
committed to pursuing prudent monetary and fiscal policies.
1 Investors rewarded countries that joined the 
gold standard by lowering their cost of capital in financial markets by approximately 30 basis points 
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003). Another explanation for joining the gold standard focuses on the importance 
of fixed exchange rates in facilitating international trade. Flandreau and Maurel (2005) and Lopez-
Cordova and Meissner (2003) provide evidence that the gold standard increased bilateral trade flows 
between 50 and 100 percent during the period 1870-1913. These studies argue that the hard peg promoted 
international trade perhaps by reducing transaction costs or exchange-rate volatility.
2 
  Although these studies correlate economic outcomes with the adoption of a hard peg, they 
provide little insight into the choice decision itself and whether contemporaries believed gold standard 
adoption would affect trade and borrowing costs.
3 To understand why countries would willingly choose to 
tie the hands of their monetary authorities and join the gold standard, it is necessary to examine the policy 
debates at the time of adoption and the factors that led to adoption. Then, one can test whether adoption 
had intended effect or unintended consequences.  
  While such an analysis might be theoretically possible at a cross-country level, it is likely to be 
more feasible to collect detailed information on the policy process and multiple outcome variables for a 
single country. In this paper, we suggest that Japan’s adoption of the gold standard in 1897 provides a 
                                                 
1 Flandreau and Zumer (2005) and Ferguson and Schularick (2006a, 2006b) provide evidence that the gold standard 
did not reduce the cost of capital during the gold standard period using a large sample of countries along with 
additional control variables in their regressions. 
2 The precise mechanism is not specified. 
3 An exception is Meissner (2005), which considers multiple factors that affected a country’s decision about when to 
adopt the gold standard. However, the analysis is primarily concerned with the process of gold standard diffusion 
rather than the political economy of adoption, and does not explicitly consider why countries adopted and how the 
decision to adopt then impacted economic outcomes such as borrowing cost, investment, and trade flows.  2   
 
well-suited laboratory for understanding why countries adopted hard pegs and how such a decision 
affected their economies. Japan’s experience is particularly interesting for three reasons. First, late 
nineteenth-century Japan has many of the characteristics of today’s emerging market economies: it was a 
small open economy with an expanding trade sector and a desire to borrow in international capital 
markets. Examining Japan’s experience may help us better understand the decision making of countries 
that adopt hard pegs today. Second, Japan’s historical archives provide detailed information on the 
political economy of gold standard adoption and the role of special interest groups in the decision making 
process. Furthermore, primary source materials from the nineteenth century also permit us to collect high 
frequency price and yield data on domestic stocks and bonds as well as annual data on bilateral trade 
flows that can be used to test ex ante and ex post economic effects of gold standard adoption. Third, 
previous researchers have argued that Japan represents the canonical case of an emerging market 
borrower benefiting from lower borrowing costs after adoption of a hard peg (Sussman and Yafeh 2000, 
2006). We examine whether policymakers viewed this as a central objective of gold standard adoption, 
and using a more complete database of Japanese sovereign debt and domestic debt issues, we re-assess 
whether borrowing rates actually fell after adoption.  
Evidence from the legislative debates of the 1890s suggests that policymakers believed gold 
standard adoption could impact borrowing costs, debt issuance, domestic investment and trade.
4 We show 
that, despite staunch opposition from the business community, the ruling party government was able to 
engineer passage of the gold standard act of 1897 by gaining the legislative support of a key opposition 
party during committee deliberations. Without the support of the Progressives, Prime Minister Masayoshi 
Matsukata would not have been able to carry the vote.  
Using newly-assembled data on trade flows and asset prices, we explicitly link the legislative 
debates to the beliefs of contemporaneous investors and to realized economic outcomes. Although some 
participants in the parliamentary debates suggested that Japan would benefit from lower rates of 
borrowing, we find no discernable trend in bond prices that would indicate that investors anticipated 
                                                 
4 Contemporary economists also noted there was debate over gold standard adoption. See Laughlin (1897). 3   
 
lower rates of borrowing. Furthermore, after it adopted the gold standard, Japan’s realized rates of 
borrowing in both international and domestic capital markets did not fall. Likewise, we find no evidence 
of domestic investors’ bidding up stock prices in anticipation of an investment boom, nor do we observe a 
boom in domestic investment in the wake of adopting the gold standard.  
Japanese policymakers of the nineteenth century also suggested that going onto gold would affect 
trade, but they were decidedly mixed as to whether it would increase it or reduce it. In examining the ex 
post effects of adoption, we find that both the opponents of adopting the gold standard (like the business 
community which had argued that Japan was receiving large benefits from being on silver) as well as 
proponents (like the ruling party, which had argued Japan would benefit from lower transactions costs and 
exchange rate volatility) turned out to be correct. Estimates from a gravity model of Japanese exports 
suggest that Japan received a large boost in trade when Japan and its partners were on the silver standard. 
However, gold standard adoption also significantly boosted exports and trade. It did so in two ways. First, 
Japan adopted the currency system through which most of the world’s trade was being conducted by the 
end of the nineteenth century. By joining the gold standard, it lowered transactions costs and exchange 
rate volatility vis-à-vis other gold standard countries. The fact that it abandoned its regional and 
historically relevant, silver-standard trading partners for the gold standard conducted, enabled it to plug 
into the monetary system through which most of the world’s trade was being conducted by the end of the 
nineteenth century. By 1897, approximately 60 percent of Japanese exports and total trade were with 
countries that were on the gold standard (or countries taking measures to join the gold club within a 
couple of years). Second, Japan’s fortuitous timing of gold standard adoption proved beneficial for some 
of its exports. In particular, Japanese exports to silver standard countries received an additional boost in 
competitiveness because Japan adopted the gold standard right as silver began to appreciate against gold.    
  The next section of the paper discusses the events leading up to Japan’s decision to go on the gold 
standard,  the debates among Japanese policymakers over the adoption of the gold standard, and the 
factors which led to legislative passage of the gold standard act in 1897. Section III examines evidence 
from bond markets in both London and Tokyo to analyze the impact of gold-standard adoption on 4   
 
sovereign yield spreads. Section IV employs a gravity model to assess the impact of adopting the gold 
standard on bilateral trade flows. Section V assesses whether investors bid up bond prices in anticipation 
of a domestic investment boom in Japan and whether Japan then subsequently realized a boom after gold 
standard adoption. Section VI discusses the implications of our results for hard pegs and for the financial 
history of the Meiji period. 
 
II. The Decision to Adopt Gold 
  During the Meiji period, Japan parted ways with its feudal past and began to forge a new national 
identity for its economy. It turned outward in its orientation (initially induced by the “gunboat diplomacy” 
of Western powers), developing industries and trading companies that sold products such as silk in 
overseas markets and borrowing internationally to fund internal improvements that would facilitate the 
movement of goods and people.
5  
At the same time Japan was forging a national economy, it was experimenting with institutions 
that would foster economic growth and stability. It introduced a national currency, the yen, in 1871. It 
imported the U.S. model of a national banking system in 1872, and in 1876, allowed these national banks 
to issue paper notes backed by government bonds. These early monetary institutions resulted in 
unsustainably high inflation rates in the late 1870s and early 1880s, and paved the way for the Japanese 
government to centralize control over the money supply. The Bank of Japan was founded in 1882, and 
thereafter, it began issuing convertible notes that hastened the demise of commercial bank note issuance. 
Japan adopted the silver standard in May 1885 and had made all yen-denominated paper money issued by 
the government convertible to silver by January 1886. It stayed on the silver standard for eleven years. 
  Beginning in 1893, the government made preparations to join the gold standard. The veteran 
finance minister, Count Masayoshi Matsukata, initiated the program
6. The government formed the 
                                                 
5 Its first national debt, issued in London in 1870 financed railway construction. 
6 Matsukata played a central role in implementing the monetary and financial reforms of the Meiji era. As an official 
of Ministry of Finance, he helped to engineer the fiscal stabilization program of the 1870s. As Finance Minister, he 
also initiated the movement to establish the central bank, the Bank of Japan. 5   
 
Committee on the Monetary System to explore what monetary system would be best for Japan’s economy 
in the long run. The committee was charged with determining the global causes of gold-silver price 
fluctuations and their consequences on the Japanese economy, and with recommending the monetary 
standard that would be best suited for Japan. As finance minister, Kunitake Watanabe, stated in setting up 
the committee, “Fluctuations in the price of gold and silver are having significant effects on the Japanese 
economy and fiscal conditions. I propose to set the committee on the monetary system…and the 
government will refer to it for building its strategy on monetary matters.”  
After seven general meetings and 41 task force meetings, the committee submitted its final report 
to the returning and reappointed finance minister Matsukata, on July 3, 1895. Only one of the seven task 
force members, a protégé of Matsukata, insisted on an immediate move to the gold standard. Of the 15 
members on the main committee (composed of government officials, business leaders, and academics), 
seven wanted to retain silver, six suggested moving to gold at some point in the future, and two desired a 
bimetallic standard. Most of the supporters of gold standard adoption were bureaucrats and politicians 
with close relationships to Matsukata whereas opponents were largely business leaders and academics. 
Despite the tepid response of the committee, Matsukata continued to press for monetary reform, and was 
emboldened to do so once China was forced to pay a large indemnity to Japan at the conclusion of the 
Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Matsukata’s strategy was to request that China pay the indemnity in pound-
sterling in London even though the original treaty stated it would be paid in silver taels. The pound 
sterling would then enable Japan to acquire gold reserves so that it could move onto the gold standard.  
After two years’ preparation for introducing the gold standard, including acquisition of gold 
reserves in overseas markets, in March of 1897, the ruling government (led by Matsukata, who had been 
both Prime Minister and Finance Minister since September 1896) officially submitted legislation to the 
Imperial Diet authorizing a gold standard.  
Once the bill was introduced, fierce debate erupted in the legislative branch of the Japanese 
government. Although a relatively new political institution, the Japanese Imperial Diet of the 1890s 
served as a counterweight to the Prime Minister-led positions of the Emperor’s ruling government 6   
 
(Muramatsu, Ito, and Tsujinaka, 2001, p.82).
7 During the 1890s, the Diet routinely rejected and cut the 
budget prepared by the ruling government, including military projects, hence exercising its right to 
provide a check on the national budget.
8 In contrast, the military was not a major political player until at 
least the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5).
9  
Without the support of at least some factions of the two major opposition parties (the 
Progressives and the Liberals), the ruling government stood little chance of passing any legislation, 
including authorization to establish the gold standard in the 1890s. For example, in September 1896, 
when Matsukata formed the Cabinet, with which he eventually introduced the gold standard, there were 
111 Liberals, 99 Progressives, and at most 89 out of the 300 seats (one vacant) of the House of 
Representatives (lower house of the Diet) who could be counted as supporting the ruling government 
(Table 1). 
National legislators such as Atsushi Kawashima, a member of Giin Kurabu [Assembly Members’ 
Club], a political faction that supported the ruling government backed Matsukata’s position, and made 
spirited arguments in favor of adoption.
10  For example, Kawashima argued that “financial credibility 
                                                 
7 Right after the Meiji Restration (1868), Japanese government was led by ex-samurai from Kagoshima (called ex-
Satsuma) and Yamaguchi (called ex-Choshu). The move to establish representation and form a Diet (the liberal 
democratic rights movement) surged in the 1870s and 1880s against the dominance of  ex-Satsuma and ex-Choshu 
in political scene. Prior to the establishment of the first national Diet in 1890, an electoral system was introduced at 
the prefectural level in 1879. A myriad of political parties was formed during the 1880s, including the powerful 
Liberal (Jiyu-to) and Progressive (Kaishin-to) parties. (Kaishin-to was sometimes also referred to by English 
contemporaries as the “Progressists” or “Progressionists” party. In 1896, Kaishin-to merged with other four smaller 
parties and renamed Shinpo-to.) The first session of the Diet occurred in November 1890. Prime Ministers were 
appointed by the Emperor with the consultation from Senators (Genro), or veterans of Meiji Restoration of 1868, 
most of whom were ex-Satsuma or ex-Choshu. Higher-ranking government bureaucrats were also dominated by ex-
Satsuma and ex-Choshu. 
8 The independent actions of the Diet in the 1890s represented a major change from the doctrine of responsibility to 
the emperor alone. Regarding the challenge to the government that came from the Diet, the press reported that 
“political parties stoutly asserted the principle of administrative responsibility to the Diet, and employed, with 
wholesale zeal, the only available means of enforcing their views – namely, destructive opposition in the 
Legislature…the public did not fail to interpret the change correctly.” (“Japanese Politics, ”The Times (London), 
December 4, 1896, p.8.) 
9 Harada (2007), pp.34-42. 
10 Atsushi Kawashima (1847-1911) was a member of House of Representatives. His career demonstrates close ties 
with Matsukata. He was born in Kagoshima, the same prefecture as Matsukata. He had served in the Ministry of 
Finance before being elected from his home region in the first national election in 1890. He was a member of the 
previous Committee on the Monetary System, and he supported the gold standard upon the voting on the 
committee’s final report. During the debate in the Diet in 1897, he belonged to a political fraction named Assembly 
Members’ Club (Giin Kurabu), which supported the ruling government. In June 1897, two months after the passage 7   
 
would be improved.” He opined that it would not only enhance Japan’s military power and domestic 
economy, but it would also stabilize Japanese finances. Japan’s yen-based payments would not be subject 
to exchange-rate risk. Kawashima suggested that adopting gold would enhance foreign investors’ credit 
on Japanese government debts and help Japan attract foreign capital at reduced rates. He argued cheap 
and affluent foreign capital could be used to build up a stronger military and promote domestic business 
activities.
11  
Legislative proponents also argued that going on gold would enhance trade. For example, 
Kawashima commented that “to compete with other countries in the trade sphere, we must have the 
common world currency as others do…The gold standard is beneficial for the development of commerce 
and industries. Japan’s main trading partners are the gold-standard countries.”
12 Ministry  of  Finance 
officials had drawn similar conclusions in the 1895 report, arguing that “many of the once-famous silver 
standard countries such as Mexico…have already moved to the gold standard. These trends indicate the 
natural course for Japan in financial and economic spheres” (Sakatani, Appendix to Final Report of the 
Committee).
13 
In addition to the benefits arising from what are now referred to as network externalities, 
Kawashima suggested that gold standard adoption would reduce exchange-rate volatility and currency 
risk. “Japan has suffered from fluctuations in domestic prices induced by exchange rate fluctuations. The 
price fluctuations induced by exchange rate fluctuations will disappear under the gold standard. Foreign 
banks have gotten a substantial premium on foreign exchange transactions of Japanese companies. The 
Japanese companies do not have to pay such premium once we introduce the gold standard. Foreign 
buyers of Japanese products will request the products more if the prices of the products are stable under 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the bills introducing the gold standard, he resigned to become the first Governor of Japan Hypothec Bank (Nippon 
Kangyo Ginko), which was also established under Matsukata’s leadership. 
11 Imperial Diet (1897), reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960, pp.133-134). Other policymakers, however, suggested this 
was unnecessary as Japan could simply issue debt denominated in gold. 
12 Imperial Diet (1897} reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960, p.135). 
13 Committee on the Monetary System (1895) reprinted in Bank of Japan (1957, p.901). 8   
 
the gold standard.”
14 Similarly, Juichi Soeda, Counselor of the Ministry of Finance, concluded: “Unless 
we could remove the exchange rate risk, we could not expect proper development of Japanese foreign 
trade.”
15 
Proponents of the gold standard suggested that adoption might also lead to an investment boom: 
“If we introduce the gold standard, foreign capital will invest in the Japanese markets and buy Japanese 
government bonds and private securities, and the Japanese commerce and industries will be booming.”
16 
In introducing the authorizing legislation, Matsukata summed up the Cabinet’s position: “First, 
fluctuations of prices will be smaller under the gold standard than under the silver standard. Second, the 
introduction of the gold standard will promote trade, especially with other gold standard countries. Third, 
the introduction of the gold standard will reduce exchange rate risk with gold standard currencies. Fourth, 
the gold standard will connect the Japanese financial market to overseas markets. As our country has been 
developing, we need more communication with overseas financial markets. Fifth, the introduction of the 
gold standard will benefit public finance.”
17  
Before becoming law, the legislation would have to first clear a vote at the committee level and 
then before the entire Diet. While the proponents of going onto the gold standard had the powerful 
backing of Matsukata and the Ministry of Finance, many other legislators believed that adopting the gold 
standard would hurt the Japanese economy and that the timing was not propitious. They noted that the 
majority opinion of the 1895 report had concluded that recent fluctuations in the gold-silver price (while 
Japan was on the silver standard) had increased the volume of exports, reduced the burdens of debtors and 
fixed taxpayers, created a boom in agriculture, and led to prosperity in commerce and industry. As Eiichi 
Shibusawa, one member of the 1895 committee and a prominent business leader wrote: “The exports to 
                                                 
14 Imperial Diet (1897) reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960, p.135). 
15 Imperial Diet (1897) reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960, p.158). 
16 Comments of Atsushi Kawashima. Imperial Diet (1897), reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960, p.136). 
17 Speech of Finance Minister Court Masayoshi Matsukata. Ministry of Finance (1905, pp.182-183). Matsukata 
suggested that the way the gold standard would increase exports was by reducing price fluctuations and making 
commercial transactions more convenient (Matsukata’s speech cited in “The Gold Standard,” The Oregonian, 
August 7, 1897). Matsukata may have also believed that adopting gold would increase the prestige and standing of 
Japan internationally, and that it was broadly consistent with the national goals of modernizing Japan’s economy and 
military. 9   
 
gold standard countries increased by more than 260 percent from 1878 to 1893 while the imports from 
these countries only increased by 70 percent over the same period. This is because the price of exports has 
fallen while the price of imports has risen. This has promoted the development of industries, technical 
progress, and growth in the demand for labor. These benefits exceed the costs of being a silver standard 
country.” (Shibusawa, Appendix to Final Report of 1985).
 18 
In the late 19
th century, Emperor Meiji set national goals of “bringing more wealth to the nation, 
and building a stronger military (fukoku kyouhei).” Business leaders such as Eiichi Shibusawa argued that 
staying on silver would be consistent with those goals. Shibusawa wrote, “The effects of the recent 
fluctuation in parity of gold and silver are quite beneficial to our economy in general under the current 
monetary system. Japanese exports to gold standard countries have increased more than imports from 
them. This is because the price of exported goods falls, while the price of imported goods increases. This 
has promoted development of industries, import substitution of many products, technical progress, growth 
in the demand for labor, and expanded national wealth. These benefits exceed the costs of being a silver 
standard country. If Japan introduces the gold standard, prices would fall, and business conditions would 
deteriorate, affecting the economy and society badly.” (Shibusawa, Appendix to Final Report).  
The business community was also largely in favor of remaining on the silver standard as export-
producing sectors of the economy had benefited from the depreciation of silver.
19 In 1898, economist 
Garrett Droppers wrote in the Quarterly Journal of Economics the following about the business 
community’s view on Japan’s monetary standard: “From 1886 to 1897, a period of over a decade, it is 
doubtful whether there was the slightest demand for return to the gold standard. On the contrary, every 
                                                 
18 Eiichi Shibusawa (1840-1931) was born into a family that was involved in sericulture located near Tokyo. After 
the Meiji Restoration, he joined Ministry of Finance and drafted the legislation to introduce a single unit of currency, 
the yen, and to establish the National Banking system. When he left the government in 1873 he established and/or 
run a number of Japan’s leading companies, including First National Bank, Oji Paper, Osaka Spinning, Kanegafuchi 
Spinning, Tokio Marine Insurance, Nippon Yusen (NYK Line), Japan Railway, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange. He 
chaired Tokyo Chamber of Commerce from 1878 to 1905 and often represented the viewpoints of the business 
community in national political debates. In Japan, he has been referred to as “Father of Japanese Capitalism.” 
19 Contemporaries from other countries also expressed doubt about the beneficial effects of the gold standard that the 
Japanese government was touting: “Foreigners, and even foreign political economists, in this country are nearly all 
trying to dissuade Japan from making the change, clearly pointing out the disadvantages to trade and industries that 
would accrue from the adoption of the gold standard.” (“The Gold Standard in Japan,” The Economist, April 24, 
1897, p.603.) 10   
 
so-called decline of silver was hailed with general satisfaction by those engaged in industrial and 
commercial pursuits.”
20 
Opposition from the business community to the gold standard was, in part, a function of the more 
unified voice of exporters. Based on data from the 1890s, Japan’s exports were concentrated in a few key 
commodities and industries. Forty-one percent of Japanese exports were silk products, and 27 percent 
were tea, rice, and matches.
21 The value added of these commodities was almost entirely domestic, and 
Japanese producers of these goods had gained the most from the depreciation of the silver yen against 
gold-standard currencies. In contrast to exports, there was no single import that accounted for a large 
portion of total imports. Raw cotton accounted for 19 percent, sugar for 10 percent, machinery for 9 
percent, and petroleum for 4 percent. Given that imports were used as inputs into a variety of products or 
were final goods sold to consumers, it proved more difficult for policymakers to drum up support from 
the business community to jettison the silver standard, since no one industry was experiencing a 
disproportionate rise in input prices (due to the depreciation of silver).  
Politicians opposing the gold standard sided with the business community and many members of 
the Committee on the Monetary System in arguing against adoption. Kungoro Shigeoka of the opposition 
Liberal Party argued that Japan’s export industries would be hurt since the price of silver had been 
declining relative to gold while Japan was on the silver standard. He reasoned that the increase in exports 
outweighed the costs of exchange-rate volatility: “Although fluctuations in gold-silver exchange rates 
might induce some inconvenience for foreign trade, the advantages in competitiveness for the silver 
standard surpass the inconvenience effect.”
22  Shigeoka also maintained that adoption of gold would 
commit Japan to persistent trade deficits driven by cheap imports and expensive exports (due to gold’s 
appreciation relative to silver). Ironically, it was the export boom during the silver standard that may have 
                                                 
20 Droppers (1898, p.164) 
21 Figures are average shares of exports based on data from 1893-1897.  
22 The great Meiji era entrepreneur Shibusawa Eiichi also argued that Japanese businesses had benefited immensely 
from cheaper exports during the silver standard; he became the flag bearer of the business community’s opposition 
to gold standard adoption (Metzler, 2006, p.30). In contrast, the Ministry of Finance argued that the benefits to trade 
and industry were only temporary. 11   
 
enabled Japan to go onto the gold standard. According to Miller (2007), export revenues during the period 
of silver deflation enabled the Imperial Navy of Japan to purchase British cruisers, defeat China in the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, and acquire the indemnity payable in gold, which enabled Japan to go onto 
the gold standard.  
In addition, Shigeoka argued the time was not right because Japan had no tariff autonomy. The 
so-called “unequal treaties” it was forced to sign with European powers and the U.S. in the 1860s limited 
its ability to set tariff rates on imports. He also argued that, even if going on gold would allow Japan to 
borrow at lower rates, these rates would only be temporary: the fall in exports to gold countries (due to 
leaving silver) would cause foreign investors to lower their assessment of Japan’s growth rate and, in the 
end, result in Japan having to borrow at higher rates.
23 
Despite this opposition, Matsukata and his allies prevailed by forging a strategic alliance with a 
key opposition party, the Progressive Party (Shinpo-to). In particular, when Matsukata formed the cabinet 
in September 1896, and as a condition of his acceptance of the post of Prime Minister, he offered the post 
of Foreign Minister to Shigenobu Okuma, the leader of the Progressive Party (another large political party 
in Japan).
24 Indeed, the ruling government found itself in a crisis of leadership after the resignation of 
Prime Minister Ito in 1896, and commentators believed that the “Matsukata-Okuma coalition seems the 
only appropriate outcome of the crisis.”
25  The press quipped that the Progressive party (which had 
previously spearheaded opposition to the government) now signaled their alliance with the Matsukata 
cabinet by “issuing a singularly tactless manifesto, in which they arranged for themselves the position of 
austere mentors.”
26 As Table 1 shows, the Progressive Party was a key player in the Diet and one of two 
parties that, along with the Liberals, often voted to block the legislation of the ruling party.
27 More 
importantly, the Progressive Party was well represented on the House of Representatives Special 
                                                 
23 Imperial Diet (1897) reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960, pp.129). 
24 “Japanese Politics,” London Times, December 4, 1896, p.8. 
25 “Japanese Politics,” London Times, December 4, 1896, p.8. 
26 “Ministerial Changes in Japan,” London Times, November 22, 1897, p.6. 
27 During his first term as Prime Minister (1891-92), Matsukata failed to get the support of Progressives and Liberals 
for the budget, which included finances for the building of warships. The failure of the budget resulted in his 
resignation (Masumi, 1966, pp.202-9 and 233-9).  12   
 
Committee on Monetary System to which the legislation was referred. Matsukata also bought off some 
Liberal party members, a subset of which established the New Liberal Party (Table 2).
28  
When the voting record and composition of the committee is examined more carefully, it is 
apparent that without the support of Progressives (who held the committee chair and made up 8 of the 26 
voting members), the legislation would have stalled at the committee level. To verify the importance of 
Matsukata’s alliance, we used a probit regression model of voting behavior. We regressed each committee 
member’s vote on individual characteristics, including party affiliation (whether the member was part of 
the progressive-ruling party coalition), occupation (whether the member had served as a public servant), 
and district of representation (whether the member was from a silk growing region, the key export at this 
time). The coefficient on party (positive and statistically significant) suggests that committee members 
voted according to party affiliation (Table 3). With the support of the Progressives and some of the 
Liberals, the legislation narrowly passed 14 to 12.  
This coalition again proved sustainable when the debate moved out of committee and to the full 
Diet. Count Mutsu, Secretary for the Japanese legation in Washington, commented in American 
newspapers that the debate seemed to have already been won by the coalition in support of adoption: “In 
many instances the discussion [in the Diet] proceeded upon lines as far removed as well could be from the 
real point at issue.”
29 The bill cleared the House of Representatives and the House of Lords and was 
proclaimed law on March 29
th. 
30 The new currency act took effect on October 1, 1897.  
 
Section III. Did Gold Standard Adoption affect Interest Rates? 
                                                 
28 A contemporary reported that some 40 members from the Liberal Party were bought off by Matsukata’s allies 
(Masumi, 1966, p.281). 
29 “Japan’s Gold Standard Law,” Salt Lake Tribune, September 14, 1897. 
30 Not all the Progressives agreed with the government’s position  For example, Ukichi Taguchi, a famous free 
market economist and a member of Progressive Party had insisted that Japan should move toward the bimetallic 
standard. He made speeches opposing to the gold standard and voted against it. However, political commentators did 
not dispute the importance of the strategic alliance. When Count Okuma retired from the cabinet in November 1897, 
“the support of the political party led by him – namely, the Progressists – leaves the Government virtually without 
any adherents in the House of Representatives.” (“Ministerial Changes in Japan,” The (London) Times, December 
29, 1897.) We were unable to locate the records of how individual Diet members voted, perhaps because the 
legislation was authorized with a simple voice vote or other majority consent procedure.  13   
 
The legislative and committee debates provide an understanding of why some policymakers 
looked favorably upon gold standard adoption for Japan. Many of the arguments made by policymakers in 
the 1890s are quite similar to those who advocate fixed exchange rates today: the ability to tap 
international capital markets at lower rates of borrowing, reduced exchange-rate instability, and greater 
trade. We now turn to assessing the consequences of gold standard adoption in order to examine whether 
policymakers’  ex ante beliefs about the effects of the gold standard were anticipated by market 
participants and whether they are consistent with realized outcomes. We begin with an assessment of the 
effects of gold standard adoption on sovereign bond yields. 
 
A. Evidence on Japanese Sovereign Debt from International Capital Markets 
One testable implication of committing to a policy rule such as the gold standard is that it should 
lower the cost of borrowing in international capital markets (Bordo and Kydland (1995) Indeed, Japan’s 
adoption of the gold standard has been frequently cited as a canonical case of the potential beneficial 
effects of joining the gold standard, and contemporary media reports noted that this was the principal 
purpose of joining gold.
31 Sussman and Yafeh (2000), for example, find that country risk of Japanese debt 
on the London market, defined as the current yield on a long-term Japanese bond minus the yield on the 
risk-free British consol declined more than fifty percent (or approximately 200 basis points) when the 
country joined the monetary rule in September 1897. They conclude that “the gold standard did 
significantly reduce the perceived risk associated with Japanese bonds (Sussman and Yafeh, 2000, p. 
442).”
32 
To carry out the empirical analysis of sovereign yield spreads, Sussman and Yafeh (2000) spliced 
the seven percent Japanese sterling bond issued in 1873 and paid off in 1897 with an unspecified long-
                                                 
31 “It is supposed that the principal object the government has in bringing about the change is to enable it, should 
such a measure become necessary or expedient, to negotiate a loan in Europe on better terms than would be possible, 
as they believe, if Japan remained on a silver basis.” (“Japan’s Gold Standard,” The Sentinel, March 30, 1897.) 
32 Using the data set from Sussman and Yafeh, Tomita (2006, p.263) reaches similar conclusions. Related to our 
discussion, Tomita does note that it is difficult to draw inferences about risk spreads since the seven percent bond is 
maturing in 1897; however, he does not provide alternative series for analyzing the behavior of the Japanese risk 
premium. 14   
 
term bond issued in 1897 or thereafter. They argue that this is the best approach for testing the effect of 
adopting the gold standard on Japanese yield spreads since “data on domestic bond yields do not exist for 
Japan until the beginning of the twentieth century” (Sussman and Yafeh, 2000, fn 9, p. 446). Their 
unspecified debt series that begins in 1897 is most likely the War Loan Bond (fully redeemed by 1950), 
which had been underwritten by the Deposit Money Bureau (the Treasury Fund) in 1895-96 and resold in 
London in 1897 as the Imperial Japanese five percent bond of 1897. We infer that this is the bond they 
used since it was the only debt issue actively traded on the London market that fits the time series plot 
shown in their paper. Figure 1 graphs these two bond series, where we have spliced them together as in 
their article. Using the current yield on the seven percent sterling loan and the five percent bond issue that 
appeared on the London market in October 1897, there appears to have been a dramatic fall in interest 
rates. 
There are some problems with splicing the two different bond series, some of which were noted 
by Sussman and Yafeh (2002), but which we explore in greater detail in order to illuminate the discussion 
of how bond yields reacted to gold standard adoption.
33  The Japanese government retired the seven 
percent sterling issue in the first half of 1897 and then sold new long-term five percent bonds that would 
be completely redeemed by 1950 in the second half of the year.
34 Japan had long planned to retire the 
bond issue in 1897, which means that the drawing had no connection with the country’s decision to join 
the gold standard except for the fact that the two events coincidentally took place in the same year 
(Ministry of Finance, 1904). Importantly, the redemption provisions of the seven percent debt issue 
placed a floor on interest rates of seven percent because investors knew that the bonds would be redeemed 
at par (where par=100) by April 1897. This means that the current yield provides little evidence about the 
Japanese cost of capital since bond market investors would necessarily take a capital loss if they 
purchased the seven percent bond at a price above par and paid the necessary transactions costs. 
                                                 
33 See footnote 24 in Sussman and Yafeh (2000), p. 457. 
34 Bond markets investors were clearly aware ahead of time that the Japanese government intended to redeem the 
bond issue by April 1897. In the original contract at the primary issue in 1873, the Japanese government announced 
it would redeem the bond issue at par by 1897 (Ministry of Finance 1904, p.621). This information was reported in 
the Official Stock Exchange Intelligence (see Official Stock Market Intelligence, 1896, p. 215).  15   
 
An alternative test for measuring the effects of joining the gold club on Japanese country risk is to 
use a single bond issue that traded both before and after gold standard adoption. If one examines the 
Investors’ Monthly Manual, the five percent Consolidated Loan bond was traded on the London Stock 
Exchange around the time of adoption.
35 Not only is this bond quoted in London, this bond was originally 
issued in Tokyo and actively traded on the Japanese market. (Table 4 lists the bonds issued and/or listed 
in London during the sample period and discussed in this article.) It began trading in London July 1896 
and had terms similar to the other bonds sold by the Japanese government on the British market in 1897. 
The Consolidated Loan bonds had a maturity length of 50 years and were callable after five years. The 
only significant difference between the Consolidated Loan and the War Loan Bond sold by the Japanese 
government immediately after gold standard adoption was that the War Loan Bond was endorsed to be 
paid in sterling.
36 Matsukata’s (1899) book on gold standard adoption confirms the existence of this 
domestic Consolidated Loan bond (Table L, p.378).  
Figure 2 shows that, in the months prior to adoption, investors did not anticipate that the gold 
standard would lower future borrowing costs. Figure 2 also shows that country risk increased after 
adoption. In March 1897, the Consolidated Loan Bond traded at the average price of 105.5 pound with 
par value of 100 pounds. After the proclamation of the gold standard, the price dropped month by month 
to 95.875 pounds in August. In October, the price rebounded a little to 99.25 pound, but then continued its 
decline. It traded at 97 pound in December 1897.  
 
B. Evidence on Japanese Sovereign Debt from the Domestic Bond Market 
Contrary to what has been asserted in some previous studies of Meiji-era Japan (Sussman and 
Yafeh, 2000), an active and liquid market for domestic government bonds existed within Japan. From 
their inception in 1878, the Osaka and Tokyo stock exchanges listed both government bonds and 
                                                 
35  This bond listed in the IMM as the “92-3-5 red” bond. 
36 Financial History of Meiji-Era, vol.8, National Debts (1904, p.837). 16   
 
company stocks. Prices and yields of bonds trading domestically can be used to clarify further whether 
Japan’s adoption the gold standard had any effects on its borrowing costs.   
From 1870-1896, the Japanese government issued seventeen bonds in the domestic market and 
two in the London Market. It also resold previously-issued domestic bonds twice in the London Market in 
1896-97. In the late 1880s and early 1890s, the Japanese securities markets grew in volume and trading 
activity. Non-financial private investors more than doubled their securities holdings from 1886 to 1896. 
Japanese non-financial private sector ownership of financial assets increased from 265 million yen to 536 
million yen between 1886 and 1896.
37 The holdings of Japanese securities were widespread during our 
sample period.
38 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) served as the central market in Japan. This market appears to 
have been well integrated with the rest of the world. Comparing the quotations for the Consolidated Loan 
bond in the London and Tokyo markets in Figure 2, we observe that the movements between the debt 
series are nearly identical. The minor differences between the interest rates probably reflect the fact that 
yields from the domestic Japanese market are computed from the average monthly bond price, while the 
yields for the London series are calculated from end-of-month prices reported in the IMM. Nevertheless, 
the Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure indicates that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be 
rejected at the five-percent level of significance for the two interest rate series.
39 The two Japanese bond 
price series share a common stochastic trend, suggesting that the London and Tokyo markets were 
integrated.   
                                                 
37 In this section, figures of financial assets are from Fujino and Teranishi (2000). 
38 Private investors, including merchants and landowners, actively invested in domestic securities, and held large 
portions of government bonds and company stocks. As of the end of 1896, non-financial private investors owned 
160-million-yen of government bonds (44 percent of the total outstanding) and 354-million-yen of company stocks 
(93 percent of total outstanding), while financial institutions owned 84-million-yen of government bonds and 27-
million-yen in equities (Fujino and Teranishi, 2000). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that merchants and 
landowners in the countryside as well as in the cities traded securities on an over the counter basis. For example, see 
Nakamura (2007). 
39 The estimated values for the λMAX and λTRACE test statistics were 15.20 and 17.12, respectively. Both the lambda 
max and lambda statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegration for yields of the Consolidated loan on 
the London and Tokyo markets can be rejected at the five percent level of significance. 17   
 
As of December 1896, TSE listed six government bonds, one municipal bond and 80 company 
stocks. Included in these domestically listed issues were two long-term bonds that traded actively on the 
Tokyo exchange before and after the country adopted the gold standard: (1) the previously mentioned five 
percent Consolidated Loan of 175 million yen that was sold at various dates between 1887 and 1895 and 
(2) the five percent War Loan of 125 million yen that was issued to help pay for the Japanese War with 
China in 1894-95. The two debt issues were to be redeemed in 1951 and 1910, respectively. Both issues 
paid interest in silver yen before the country adopted the gold standard in September 1897. After joining 
the monetary rule, the Japanese government began making interest payments on its domestic debt 
obligations in gold yen. This means that joining the gold standard could have also reduced exchange-rate 
risk, the risk associated with changes in the value of the currency, in addition to country or political risk. 
Figure 3 shows the current yield for the two Japanese bond series from 1887-1910. The two series 
are highly correlated and do not seem to significantly decline with the introduction of the gold standard. 
Figure 3 suggests that domestic interest rates in Japan may have actually increased after the adoption of 
the gold standard.
 Nor do they seem to have fallen prior to formal adoption, which might suggest that 
investors were anticipating lower future borrowing costs. Simple summary statistics show that Japanese 
interest rates were more or less flat prior to adoption and increased by approximately 30 basis points in 
the six months after the country adopted the gold standard.
40 We can gain some additional insight into 
whether investors were anticipating lower borrowing costs by examining reports from the investment 
community at that time. The Economist (p.879) wrote on June 19, 1897 that “the Japanese imagine that 
because they are adopting a gold standard currency their 5 per cent loans should command a higher price, 
but that they are trading below par (at 98 per cent) and “if any large amount were placed on the market 
there would soon be a considerable decline in the price.” As a robustness check, Figure 4 shows the 
interest-rate differential between Japanese bonds and the “risk-free” British consol. The interest-rate 
                                                 
40 Japanese interest rates increased by about 15 basis points in the six months prior to Japan joining the gold 
standard. 18   
 
differential should help control for the effect of gold inflation that began in 1897-98. Again, the Japanese 
yield spread does not appear to decline with the adoption of the gold standard.
41 
  Finally, if adopting the gold standard was meant to improve Japan’s reputation in capital markets 
and allow it to issue more debt, the period directly after adopting gold is very revealing. Confident with 
the victory of the Sino-Japanese war and the introduction of the gold standard, in 1899 the government 
floated a new ¥100 million bond issue in London. It sold at 90 percent of par with a current yield of 4.45 
percent – a much higher interest rate than predicted by Matsukata and the Japanese authorities. The 
Japanese government then purchased much of the outstanding issue at 86 percent of par, an even deeper 
discount with a yield of 4.65% (Suzuki, 1994). If we also account for the fact that the bonds were 
denominated in sterling, which reduced exchange rate risk, then the new debt issue offered about the same 
yield (4.8%) as the yen-denominated consolidated bonds that traded in London. Moreover, this debt issue 
met with tepid response from foreign investors. Less than 10 percent of the primary issue was purchased 
in the London market. The Japanese government (with assistance from the Bank of Japan) responded by 
purchasing nearly 45 percent of the issue, with the underwriters having to absorb the remainder. Japan 
had believed its credit rating, after adopting gold was “between Germany and Italy,” but according to 
Suzuki (1994) and Metzler (2006), it had overestimated its creditworthiness in foreign markets and later 
additional attempts to engage foreigners in purchasing these bonds (including attempts by J.P. Morgan 
and Co., Baring Brothers, and the Rothschilds) were rebuffed by investors.  
   Furthermore, archival evidence suggests that if, anything, the reason why Japan issued little debt 
in the 1880s and early 1890s had more to do with fear of being colonized by foreign creditor governments 
than it did with not being on gold. For example in July 1880, Former Finance Minister Shigenobu Okuma 
and former Internal Minister Hirobumi Ito jointly proposed the establishment of “the specie bank,” which 
                                                 
41 We formally tested this hypothesis using structural break analysis and following the procedure developed by Zivot 
and Andrews (1992).The structural break tests for yield spreads and interest rates over the sample period 1892-1902 
are not statistically significant at the five- or ten-percent level of significance. We also tested for a structural break 
over the entire sample period 1887-1910 and found no evidence that the gold standard significantly reduced interest 
rates. We also are not able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in favor of a structural break model. Results are 
available from the authors upon request. 19   
 
would be the Japanese equivalent of the Bank of England or the Bank of France. To this end, they 
proposed to issue a government bond which would be salable to foreign investors.
42 Fearing foreign 
control in Japanese affairs, Internal Minister Matsukata strongly opposed this idea, writing in September, 
“We are now in a vulnerable position without having the independence of tariff and justice. If we 
depended on capital of foreigners, who are superior in knowledge and financial power, we should be in a 
big trouble even though we might see a temporary inflow of specie. We would have nothing to do when 
Japan should be a country like Egypt, Turkey or India.”
43 Matsukata turned down the proposal, and two 
years later, as finance minister, he established the Bank of Japan, which was purely domestic.  
 
Section IV. How did Gold Standard Adoption affect Trade? 
  As identified by the parliamentary debates and the Committee on the Monetary System, 
policymakers also believed that trade would be impacted by the adoption of the gold standard, but there 
was considerable disagreement as to how it would affect trade. Some believed that maintaining the silver 
standard was beneficial to trade as it enabled Japan to sell its exports more cheaply to gold standard 
countries. Others argued that adopting gold would be beneficial for trade as it would lower exchange-rate 
volatility and transaction costs. Other policymakers noted that the gains from being on silver were 
transitory, based on a favorable silver-gold price that would not persist, and that going on gold would at 
least permit Japan to trade among a global trade network that was organized around gold and not silver.  
To test these three hypotheses, we estimate a gravity model of Japan’s bilateral export flows 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We collected data on bilateral trade flows 
between Japan and other countries from the Principal Trade of Foreign Countries of the British Board of 
Trade Statistics and from Japan’s Ministry of Finance, Annual Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire 
of Japan. These two primary sources contain more than 800 observations on Japanese bilateral trade 
flows with twenty-six of its main trading partners for the years 1877-1912. The sample contains data on 
                                                 
42 Okuma (1880). 
43 Matsukata (1880). 20   
 
bilateral flows between Japan and countries from Asia, Europe, North and South America including: 
Australia, Canada, China, England, French Indochina, Hawaii, Hong Kong, India, Korea, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Siam, Straits Settlement, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Peru, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Russia, Turkey, and the United States. 
A gravity model is a very simple empirical relationship meant to capture the main effects of trade: 
mass and distance. As in a standard gravity equation, mass (measured here by the size of countries) is 
proportional to trade whereas distance should vary inversely. Given that we do not have GDP estimates 
for many of the dyadic trade pairs in our sample, we use population as a proxy for mass which has been 
shown to have a correlation of nearly ninety percent with output estimates for the classical gold standard 
period (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2007).  
We augment the gravity equation with additional covariates which are meant to capture other 
influences on bilateral trade. We include railroad track miles to proxy for the importance of transportation 
infrastructure in promoting bilateral trade flows. We include a dummy variable to indicate whether 
Japan’s trading partner is landlocked. Since some studies have indicated that war negatively impacts trade 
flows (Glick and Taylor, 2006), a war indicator variable is included to take into account the fact that 
Japan fought two wars during our sample period. The indicator variable takes on a value of 1 when Japan 
was at war with China (1894-95) or Russia (1904-05) for those respective dyads. We also code a Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) dummy variable as unity in cases where Japan has a reciprocal MFN arrangement 
(or in Korea and China where it imposed unilateral agreements during our sample period).  
The basic estimation equation is:  
(1) ln(EXPORTSit) = β0  +  β1PaperBimetit + β2PaperPaperit + β3PaperGoldit + β4SilverSilverit + 
β5GoldGoldit + β6SilverGoldit + β7SilverPaperit + β8GoldPaperit + β9GoldSilverit + β10MFNit + β11ln(Dist)i 
+ β12Lndlcki + β13ln(RRi)t + β14ln(PopiPopj)t + β15Wari,t-k  + εit 
 
where i denotes a trade partner of Japan, j denotes Japan, t denotes time, k denotes lags, and other 
variables are defined as: 
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•  EXPORTSit denotes Japanese exports to country i at time t; 
•  PaperBimet is a binary variable which is unity if Japan is on the paper standard and country i is 
on the bimetallic standard. 
•  PaperPaper is a binary variable which is unity if country i and Japan are both on a fiat money 
standard. 
•  PaperGold is a binary variable which is unity if Japan is on a fiat money standard and country i is 
on the gold standard. 
•  SilverSilver is a binary variable which is unity if country i and Japan both are on the silver 
standard; 
•  GoldGold is a binary variable which is unity if country i and Japan are both on the gold standard; 
•  SilverGold is a binary variable which is unity if Japan is on the silver standard and country i is on 
the gold standard. 
•  SilverPaper is a binary variable which is unity if Japan is on the silver standard and country i is 
on a fiat money standard. 
•  GoldPaper is a binary variable which is unity if Japan is on the gold standard and country i is on a 
fiat money standard. 
•  GoldSilver is a binary variable which is unity if Japan is on the gold standard and country i is on 
the silver standard. 
•  MFN is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if Japan has negotiated a reciprocal most favored 
nation treaty with a trade partner or if it has imposed a unilateral MFN on a trade partner that is in 
effect at time t. 
•  Dist is distance between Japan and country i; 
•  Lndlck is a binary variable which is unity if Japan’s trade partner is landlocked; 
•  RR is railroad track miles; 
•  Pop is population; 
•  War is a binary variable which is unity for Japanese exports to China during the Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-95) and unity for Japanese exports to Russia during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-
05); 
•  and ε is a well-behaved error term capturing other influences on bilateral trade.  
 
The coefficients β1-β9 measure the effects of Japan’s various monetary standards on bilateral trade 
flows. The gold and silver dummy variables, SilverSilver and GoldGold, capture the network externalities 
associated with Japan first adopting silver and being on the same currency regime as other silver standard 
countries, and then later adopting gold and sharing that currency regime with other countries. If 
membership in the same monetary standard reduces transactions costs or exchange rate volatility, then the 
coefficients on the SilverSilver and GoldGold dummy variables should be positive and statistically 
significant. By coding additional dummy variables reflecting the currency arrangements of all its trading 
partners, not just those with which it shared the standard, we can simultaneously test for the other 
hypotheses that follow from the historical debates of gold standard adoption. In particular, the pairs 22   
 
SilverGold and GoldSilver enable us to determine whether Japan’s exports benefitted from movements in 
the price of silver relative to gold. While Japan was on the silver standard, this metal was depreciating 
relative to gold, so as argued by some legislators and exporters, Japan may have received a boost in its 
trade to gold standard countries as a result of this price movement. (This would be reflected in a 
positively signed and statistically significant coefficient on SilverGold.) Then, about the time when Japan 
joined the gold standard, gold began to depreciate against silver; so once Japan was on gold its exports to 
silver countries may have been more competitive, and hence higher.  
We estimate equation (1) with importer-country fixed effects as well as year dummies to control for 
annual shocks such as global financial crises and recessions. The fixed-effects or within estimator is 
equivalent to adding a complete set of country-pair intercepts to the estimating equation. Our first 
regression specification, shown in column 1 of Table 5, uses the paper standard as a basis of comparison; 
hence, the omitted dummy variable is when Japan was on the paper standard and other countries were on 
the silver standard (in our nomenclature, PaperSilver). Using this specification, we can directly assess the 
impact of switching from a fiat standard to a commodity exchange-rate regime. Since many of Japan’s 
most important trading partners historically were on silver, this specification allows us to examine 
whether there were gains to adopting the same standard as its neighbors on silver, such as China and 
Korea.  Conditioning on other variables, when Japan switched from paper to silver and its trade partner 
was also on silver (SilverSilver), exports received a boost of over 1,094 percent ((e
2.48-1)*100). This 
positively signed and statistically significant (at the one-percent level) network externality effect suggests 
that there were initially large gains to moving to the same monetary standard as its regional trade partners; 
it reduced exchange rate volatility and lowered transactions costs.  
When Japan then switched to gold and traded with other gold standard countries, bilateral trade flows 
increased by approximately 953 percent (relative to the baseline of PaperSilver). (The effect is 
statistically significant at the five-percent level.) The switch to the silver standard also appears to have 
raised Japan’s exports to gold standard countries (SilverGold), and its subsequent adoption of gold 
appears to have then raised exports to silver standard countries. When Japan was on the silver standard 23   
 
and its trade partner was on gold, exports increased by 860 percent.
44 Hence, advocates of the silver 
standard were correct in emphasizing that Japan had received an enormous boost in its trade due to the 
depreciation of silver when it was on the silver standard. This statistically significant effect is consistent 
with policymakers’ beliefs of what had occurred prior to 1897: Japan’s manufacturing exports benefitted 
from the decline in the relative price of silver. However, when Japan was on the gold standard and its 
trade partner was on silver, exports increased by 1525 percent. Hence, proponents of going to gold were 
also correct in that Japan’s exports did not lose out on their competitive advantage with the switch from 
silver to gold, although perhaps more out of luck than out of perfect foresight. That is, gold began to 
depreciate against silver at about the same time that Japan joined the gold standard. If Japan had remained 
on silver until 1913, it would not only have seen its competitiveness deteriorate, but it would also have 
lost out on the gain in competitiveness form gold’s depreciation relative to silver. Overall, these 
statistically significant coefficients suggest that relative to initially being on a fiat standard, a substantial 
part of the gains from trade from going onto either gold or silver had to do with the movement in the 
silver-gold price ratio and the competitiveness effects associated with this movement. 
Our other policy and institutional variables, trade agreements (MFN) and war dummies, are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. In terms of our other covariates, distance from Japan has a 
strong negative impact and strong transportation networks in importing countries (proxied by railways) 
increased Japanese exports.  Although population has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
exports, the unconditional correlation between (log) exports and population is positive, but not 
statistically significantly different from zero.
45  
  The second column of Table 5 uses a slightly different baseline for comparison so that we can 
more carefully consider the network externality effects of moving from the silver standard to the gold 
                                                 
44 Metzler (2006) also suggests Japan saw an increase in trade when it was on the silver standard, although he does 
not provide a formal test as we do here. 
45 When use a median regression model for exports, we find that population has a positive sign, but is insignificant 
at conventional levels of statistical significance. 24   
 
standard. In this regression, the omitted category is SilverSilver.
46 The sign on GoldGold is positive, but 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the gains from being part of the gold club were not substantially 
larger than those when Japan was on silver.
47 This coefficient suggests that there was no differential 
impact in terms of a network effect relative to the silver standard’s network effect.
 48 So if adopting gold 
did not raise Japanese exports (relative to the network externality effects of the silver standard), then did 
Japanese trade receive any benefits from gold standard adoption?  
The answer may lie in Japan’s growing share of global trade coming from gold standard 
countries. By the late 1890s, most of the world’s largest economies were on gold (U.S., UK, and 
Germany) and much of the rest of the world was abandoning bimetallic, silver, and paper standards for 
gold (Meissner, 2005). For example, Austria pegged its currency to gold in the mid-to-late 1890s, Russia 
joined gold in 1897, India joined gold in 1898, and Argentina adopted in 1900. The benefits to remaining 
on silver, even in Asia, were declining as the world moved to gold (Mitchener and Voth, 2009). Hence, as 
the 19
th century drew to a close, the longer Japan remained on silver, the smaller the benefit it would 
receive by being linked to the same monetary regime of its historical and regional trading partners (silver 
countries such as China and Korea).The network effect of silver was strong for Japan (as demonstrated by 
the statistically insignificant coefficient on GoldGold in column 2), but as emphasized by contemporary 
policymakers like Sakatani, Japan’s trade was turning outward, beyond Asia, to a world that was 
increasingly dominated by the gold standard. By 1897, nearly 60 percent of all Japanese exports and trade 
were conducted with gold standard countries in 1897. In comparison, silver accounted for approximately 
30 percent of exports and 35 percent of total trade flows.  
 
V. Did the Gold Standard Create an Investment Boom? 
 
                                                 
46 The change in the omitted category means that we now include SilverPaper in the regression.  
47 The constant term in the regression is large, positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting 
that network externality of effect of silver was large. 
48 Consistent with the regression results in column 1, Japan’s trade was lower when it was on paper and traded with 
silver countries, suggesting the strong network externality effect of being on the silver standard. 25   
 
Some Japanese policymakers also believed that joining the gold standard could initiate a domestic 
investment boom. Adherence to the monetary rule would lower domestic interest rates, leading firms to 
invest in new plant and equipment (due to lower overall borrowing costs in the economy). Declining 
interest rates may also precipitate a run up in stock prices as stocks become relatively more attractive in 
comparison to bonds.  
To examine the investment-boom hypothesis, we first gathered new monthly data on Japanese 
stock prices around the time of gold standard adoption from the archives of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
Based on data for stocks listed and actively traded on the Tokyo exchange, we calculated a monthly 
capitalized market index of 13 companies for the period 1895-1899. The index represents approximately 
70 percent of the capitalized market value of the Japanese stock exchange.
49  If expected profitability of 
Japanese companies improved in anticipation of gold standard adoption or after gold standard adoption, 
then this should have been capitalized into stock prices, and our composite index should show an increase 
after the time of adoption. 
However, as Figure 5 shows, the data do not support the idea that the gold standard created an 
investment boom that led to higher profitability of Japanese firms. The Japanese stock market index 
increased in the beginning of the sample period before declining by more than 35 percent in the one-year 
period before Japan joined the gold standard. This suggests that investors did not anticipate higher 
expected future profitability as a result of adoption. The stock market index then fell by an additional ten 
percent in the year after Japan joined the gold standard, suggesting that, after adoption, investors 
perceived that firms were not large beneficiaries of a dramatically lower of interest rates. As a robustness 
check, we also calculated an unweighted stock market index for the period. As shown in Figure 6, the 
unweighted stock market index declined more than 30 percent after gold standard adoption. Bank of 
Japan reported that the stock market remained dull throughout 1897, including the period prior to and 
after the adoption of the gold standard. It said, “The stock market in 1897 was dull in general. While the 
                                                 
49 Although it is possible that the increase in bilateral trade flows might have led to a surge in domestic investment, 
most of the firms included in our stock sample were involved in domestic finance and transport – railway companies 
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adoption of the gold standard brought a temporary boom to the stock market, investors held still after all 
because they had a feeling of anxiety for the future. In March, stock prices surged because the passage of 
the New Currency Act brought a speculation of capital inflow in the future. But, it did not last for a 
month, and the market turned dull in early April.” Commentators noted that the decline in security prices 
reflected a general feeling of uncertainty in the business community following gold standard adoption.
50 
Contemporaries reported that the adoption of the gold standard did not expand the borrowing 
capacity of Japan nor did it bring about a domestic investment boom. Japanese newspaper accounts 
written at the end of 1897 generally condemned the gold standard. The Jiji Shinpo called adoption of gold, 
“the worst mistake ever committed by the government in the long history of the 30 years that have passed 
since the Meiji era began. The Matsukata ministry, however, must bear the full responsibility for it.”
51 
Newspapers generally acknowledged that “the financial situation in Japan is worse than it was in 1896. 
Public securities have fallen; railway and industrial shares are very low, and many new undertakings have 
stopped for lack of funds…Foreign capital has not come in, neither have the public securities 
appreciated.”
52 On December 14, 1897, the nationwide newspaper, Yomiuri Shinbun, quoted prominent 
economist, Tameyuki Amano, as describing the current economic condition as a combination of 
insufficient capital and falling prices of stock and goods in general. He attributed the stagnating economy 
to lack of credibility of the Japanese economy among the international investors and the absence of 
capital inflow in spite of the adoption of the gold standard. The Yomiuri Shinbun also reported in 
December 1897 that adoption of gold may have led to a financial panic in Osaka – news that was also 
reported by the American press.
53 On August 5, 1898, the Yomiuri Shinbun reported that even though a 
number of railway companies had tried to attract foreign investment, none had succeeded. On October 19, 
1898, the newspaper further commented that investment in Japan was not attractive for international 
                                                 
50 Droppers (1898, p.177). 
51 The views of Japanese newspapers were summarized in the following article: “Japan and her Gold Standard,” 
Denver Evening Post, March 2, 1898. 
52 “Japan and her Gold Standard,” Denver Evening Post, March 2, 1898. 
53 See, for example, “Gold Standard Panic in Japan,” Daily News, Denver, December 17, 1897, p.5. 27   
 
investors mainly because of lack of credibility despite the fact that Japan had been on gold for more than 
a year. 
Policymakers also saw no boom in the Japanese economy. The annual report of Bank of Japan in 
1897 said, “in light of larger expectation of capital inflow to Japanese markets, prominent investors from 
the United States and France came to Japan to explore the feasibility of investments. But, they returned 
home with no achievement for their goal.” The report in 1898 continued, “some (international) investors 
tried to launch new projects for foreign capital introduction into Japan, but all attempts failed… The 
government explored the feasibility of issuing bond in the foreign markets as well as in the domestic 
markets, but they were not able to do so. They were forced to finance the deficit by the remaining balance 
of Chinese indemnity.” Clearly, Japan was failing to attract foreign capital or create an investment boom 
by adopting the gold standard.
54 
In order to assess further whether an investment boom occurred after gold standard adoption, we 
collected data on the investment-GNP ratio. We compared the average investment-GNP ratio for the five-
year period before Japan (1893-1897) joined the gold standard with the five-year period after Japan joined 
gold (1898-1902). We chose to end the “gold standard effect” in 1902 since some scholars have noted that 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) enhanced the country’s international standing and credibility (Metzler, 
2006; Sussman and Yafeh, 2000). The average investment-GNP ratio was actually higher in the five-year 
period before Japan joined the gold standard than afterwards (17.1 versus 16 percent). As a robustness 
check, we dropped the value of the ratio for 1897 from the pre-gold period (since Japan voted to join gold 
in March but did not formally adopt the monetary rule until September) and recomputed the investment-
GNP ratio in the five-year period before and after 1897. The investment-GNP ratio is slightly higher 
when Japan was on the silver standard than after it went on gold: 16.3 versus 16 percent.
 55 Overall, the 
                                                 
54 Bank of Japan (1898, 1899).  
55 As a robustness check, we also compared the silver period 1888-1897 with the gold period 1898-1902 as well as 
the silver period 1896-97 with the gold period 1898-1899. In all cases, we could not statistically reject the null 
hypothesis that joining the gold standard had no effect on the investment-GDP ratio. 28   
 
empirical evidence suggests that joining the gold standard did not stimulate a boom in the Japanese equity 
market or in investment spending. 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper argues that in order to understand the reasons why countries adopted monetary 
standards and the consequences this choice had on their economies, it is helpful to begin the analysis by 
considering the political economy of the adoption decision. Interest groups may not be aligned (as their 
objective functions may differ) and outcomes may be uncertain. Examining countries adoption decisions 
on a case-by-case basis, as we do in this paper, enables the researcher to design empirical tests that are 
based on the ex ante beliefs of policymakers and to measure investor perceptions of adoption as well as 
the effects of adoption on multiple economic outcomes.  
Our examination of the historical record suggests that a priori policymakers were split over of 
Japan’s decision to join the gold standard in 1897. Many influential business leaders, academics, and 
government officials emphasized that adopting gold as the monetary standard would significantly impact 
trade, but they disagreed over whether it would be beneficial or detrimental. Some, like Matsukata, 
argued that it would increase exports because other countries were moving to gold and that Japan would 
have less exchange-rate volatility and lower transaction costs if it too were on gold. Others argued that it 
would prematurely terminate the benefits of being on silver: the declining price of silver since 1870 had 
been lowering the relative price of Japanese exports and many of Japan’s most important trading partners 
were on the silver standard. Other policymakers encouraged Japan to adopt the gold standard for different 
reasons – that it would be perceived by markets as a move towards better institutions and would hence 
lower Japan’s borrowing costs. Prime Minister Matsukata, however, forged a successful coalition with a 
rival party to overcome opposition to the legislation.  
Investors, however, did not seem to be swayed that gold standard adoption would have lasting 
effects on either borrowing costs or domestic investment. Using newly assembled data on asset prices, we 
show that stock prices and government bonds did not move in anticipation of gold standard adoption. We 29   
 
further show that Japan’s adoption of the gold standard did not lower Japan’s borrowing costs nor lead to 
a surge in domestic investment. Based on evidence from both international and domestic capital markets, 
if anything, there was a slight increase in the rates of borrowing after adoption. These findings suggest a 
reinterpretation of Meiji financial history since previous studies had associated a reduction in borrowing 
costs with gold standard adoption. While it is theoretically possible that a hard peg can serve as a 
mechanism for solving the time inconsistency problem, the case of Japan does not appear to be the 
canonical case study of such a mechanism.  
Instead, Japan’s experience suggests that metallic standards had a much more significant effect on 
exports. Estimates from gravity models show that exports increased when Japan went onto both the silver 
and gold standards. Our results suggest that Japan received a large boost to its bilateral trade when it was 
on the silver standard both through network externalities and via competitiveness effects: the declining of 
silver relative to gold boosted exports to gold standard countries. Nevertheless, Japan’s adoption of the 
gold standard proved to be fortuitously timed as the decline in silver prices reversed course at around the 
same time Japan made the switch to gold and when the rest of the world was moving to the gold standard. 
We find evidence that when Japan was on the gold standard its exports to other gold countries were 
higher, relative to the reference period of paper, and that its trade with silver countries benefitted due to 
the decline in the price of gold. If Japan had remained on the silver standard it would have necessarily 
foregone a large gain in the competitiveness of its exports (something that was not known to 
policymakers ex ante) and faced a declining benefit via network externalities as more and more countries 
adopted gold. The political economy approach that we have used to study Japan’s adoption decision has 
shed new light on the reasons for and consequences of adoption, and suggests a robust alternative to the 
cross-country approach that could be employed to examine the adoption of gold for other countries during 




Bank of Japan. (1898). “Meiji 30 Nen Nippon Ginko Tokei Nenpo” [Statistical Abstract of Bank of 
Japan, 1897], reprinted in Bank of Japan (1957), Nihon Kin’yu Shi Shiryo: Meiji/Taisho Hen, 
vol.19 [Materials of Japan’s Financial History: Meiji/Taisho Edition], vol.19, pp. 279-326. 
Bank of Japan. (1899). “Meiji 31 Nen Nippon Ginko Tokei Nenpo” [Statistical Abstract of Bank of 
Japan, 1898] reprinted in Bank of Japan (1957), Nihon Kin’yu Shi Shiryo: Meiji/Taisho Hen 
[Materials of Japan’s Financial History: Meiji/Taisho Edition], vol.19, pp. 327-366. 
Bordo, Michael and Finn Kydland. (1995). “The Gold Standard as a Rule: An Essay in Explorations.” 
Explorations in Economic History vol. 32(4) pp. 423-64.  
 
Bordo, Michael and Hugh Rockoff. (1996). “The Gold Standard as a Good Housekeeping Seal of  
Approval” Journal of Economic History vol. 56 pp. 389-428. 
 
Bytheway, Simon. (2001). “Japan’s adoption of the Gold Standard: Financial and Monetary Reform in the 
Meiji Period.” In John McGuire, Patrick Bertola, and Peter Reeves (eds.) Evolution of the World 
Economy, Precious Metals and India. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.79-95. 
Christiano, Lawrence (1992). “Searching for a Break in GNP.” Journal of Business and  Economic 
Statistics vol. 10 pp. 237-50. 
Committee on the Monetary System. (1895). “Final Report,”reprinted in Bank of Japan (1957), Nihon 
Kin’yu Shi Shiryo: Meiji/Taisho Hen, [Materials of Japan’s Financial History: Meiji/Taisho 
Edition], 17. 
Droppers, Garrett. (1898). “Monetary Changes in Japan.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 12(2): 153-185. 
Ferguson, Niall and M. Schularick. (2006a). “The Empire Effect: The Determinants of Country Risk in 
the First Era of Globalization.” Journal of Economic History vol. 66(2) pp. 283-312. 
Ferguson, Niall and M. Schularick. (2006b). “The Thin Film of Gold: The Limits of Monetary 
Commitments.” Harvard Business School Working Paper. 
Flandreau, Marc and Mathilde Maurel. (2005). “Monetary Union, Trade Integration, and Business Cycles 
in the 19
th Century.” Open Economies Review vol. 16(2) pp. 135-52.   
Flandreau, Marc and Frederic Zúmer. (2004). The Making of Global Finance. Paris: OECD.  
Fujino, Shozaburo, and Juro Teranishi. (2000). Nihon Kin’yu no Suryo Bunseki [A Quantitative Analysis 
of Finance in Japan], Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha. 
Glick, Reuven and Alan M. Taylor (2006). Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic 
Impact of War,” NBER Working Paper 11565. 
Harada, Keiichi. (2007). Nisshin-Nichiro Senso: Nihon Kin-Gendai Shi, [Sino/Russo-Japanese War: 
Modern and Contemporary Japanese History], 3, Iwanami Shoten.  
Imperial Diet. (1897). “Teikoku Gikai Sokkiroku: Dai-Jukkai Teikoku Gikai” [Minutes of General 
Assembly and Committees of the 10
th Session], reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960), Nihon Kin’yu 
Shi Shiryo: Meiji/Taisho Hen, 14 [Materials of Japan’s Financial History: Meiji/Taisho Edition], 
14. 
Kydland, Finn and Edward Prescott. (1985). “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal 
Plans.” Journal of Political Economy vol. 85(3) pp. 473-91. 31   
 
Laughlin, J. Laurence. (1897). “The Gold Standard in Japan.” Journal of Political Economy 5(3): 378-83.  
 
Lopez-Cordova, J. Ernesto and Christopher Meissner. (2003). “Exchange-Rate Regimes 
and International Trade: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard Era.” American Economic 
Review vol. 93(1) pp. 344-53. 
 
Masumi, Jun’nosuke. (1965). Nihon Seito-Shi Ron [A Thesis on the History of Japanese Political Party 
System] vol. I, University of Tokyo Press.  
Masumi, Jun’nosuke. (1966). Nihon Seito-Shi Ron [A Thesis on the History of Japanese Political Party 
System] vol. II, University of Tokyo Press.  
Matsukata, Masayoshi. (1880). “Zaisei-Gi” [On Financial Policy], reprinted in Bank of Japan (1958), 
Nihon Kin’yu Shi Shiryo: Meiji/Taisho Hen, 4 [Materials of Japan’s Financial History: 
Meiji/Taisho Edition], 4, pp. 983-988. 
Matsukata, Masayoshi. (1899). Report on the Adoption of the Gold Standard in Japan, Tokyo, the 
Government Press. 
Mauro, Paolo, Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh. (2006). Emerging Markets and Financial 
Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Metzler, Mark. (2006). Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in 
Prewar Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Meissner, Chris. (2005). “A New World Order: Explaining the International Diffusion of the Gold 
Standard, 1870-1913.” Journal of International Economics. 66: 385-406. 
Miller, Edward S. (2007). Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl 
Harbor. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 
Ministry of Finance. (1904). Meiji Zaisei Shi, 8: Kokusai [Financial History of the Meiji-Era, 8: National 
Debts]. 
Ministry of Finance. (1905). Meiji Zaisei Shi, 11: Tuka [Financial History of the Meiji Era, 11: Money]. 
Ministry of Finance; Financial Bureau. (1898). “Kahei-Hou Seitei oyobi Jisshi Houkoku” [The Report on 
the Legislation of the Currency Act and its Implementation], reprinted in Bank of Japan (1958), 
Nihon Kin’yu Shi Shiryo: Meiji/Taisho Hen, 17 [Materials of Japan’s Financial History: 
Meiji/Taisho Edition], 17, pp. 1-289. 
Ministry of Finance. (1898). “Meiji 30 Nen Heisei Kaikaku Shimatsu Gaiyou” [The Overview of the 
Reform of the Monetary System in 1899], reprinted in Bank of Japan (1958), Nihon Kin’yu Shi 
Shiryo: Meiji/Taisho Hen, 17 [Materials of Japan’s Financial History: Meiji/Taisho Edition], 17, 
pp. 291-558. 
Mitchener, Kris James and Hans Joachim Voth. (2009). “Trading Silver for Gold: Asian Exports and the 
Political Economy of Currency Unions.” Unpublished Working Paper prepared for the Asian 
Development Bank. 
Mitchener, Kris James and Marc D. Weidenmier. (2007). “Trade and Empire,” Santa Clara University 
Working Paper. 
Muramatsu, Michio, Mitsutoshi Ito, and Yutaka Tsujinaka. (2001). Nihon no Seiji [Japanese Politics], 2
nd 
edition, Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha. 
Murase, Shinya (1976). “The Most-Favored Nation Treatment in Japan’s Treaty Practice during the 
Period, 1854-1905.” American Journal of International Law vol. 70(2) pp.273-297. 32   
 
 
Nakamura, Naofumi. (2007). “Meijiki no Yuka Shoken Toshi (Securities Investments in Meiji Era),” Ishii, 
Kanji and Satoru Nakanishi eds., Sangyoka to Shoka Keiei [Industrialization and the Family 
Merchant Business], Nagoya University Press. 
Obstfeld, Maurice and Alan M. Taylor. (2003). “Sovereign Risk ,Credibility and the Gold Standard, 
1870-1913 versus 1925-1931.” Economic Journal vol. 113 (487) pp. 1-35. 
Official Stock Market Intelligence. Various years. London. 
Okuma, Shigenobu. (1880). “Kousai Shinbo oyobi Ginkou no Setsuritu ni Kansuru Seigi” [An Proposal 
for A New Government Bond Issue and the Establishment of A Bank], reprinted in Bank of Japan 
(1958), Nihon Kin’yu Shi Shiryo: Meiji/Taisho Hen, 4 [Materials of Japan’s Financial History: 
Meiji/Taisho Edition], 4, pp. 754-756. 
Shimura, Kaichi. (1980). Nihon Koushasai Shijou Shi [A History of Bond Markets in Japan], Tokyo, 
University of Tokyo Press. 
 
Sussman, Nathan and Yishay Yafeh. (2000). “Institutions, Reforms and Country Risk: Lessons from 
Japanese Government Debt in the Meiji Period,” Journal of Economic History vol. 60 pp. 442-67. 
 
Suzuki, Toshio. (1994). Japanese Government Loan Issues on the London Capital Market, 1870-1913, 
London, The Athlone Press. 
 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. (1928). Tokyo Kabushiki Torihikijo 50 Nenshi [50 years History of Tokyo Stock 
Exchange], Tokyo, Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
 
Tomita, Toshiki. (2006). Kokusai no Rekishi [A History of National Debts], Tokyo, Toyo Keizai Shinpo 
Sha. 
 
Zivot, Eric and Donald Andrews. (1992). “Further Evidence on the Great Crash, Oil Price Shock, and the 
Unit Root Hypothesis.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics vol. 10 pp.251-70. 33   
 
 
Table 1. Composition of the House of Representatives, September 1896 
(Lower House of Diet)       
 Party  Affiliation Strategic  Voting  Name of Bloc  
People's Association  32       
others/independent 57  89  Government-oriented 
parties 
Progressive Party  99  99  Strategic alliance 
Liberal Party  111  111  Opposition party 
Total 299       
        
Source: House of Representatives and House of Peers,    
Gikai Seido Nanaju Nen Shi [Seventy Years History of Parliamentary System], 1961. 
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Table 2. Members of the Special Committee on Monetary System, House of Representatives (1897)
Last Name First Name
Vote on Gold 
Standard Party
Ruling=1, 
Opposition=0 Electral District Previous Profession
Taketomi Tokitoshi neutral(chair) Progressive 1 Saga politician
Ito Tokutaro against Liberal 0 Chiba business (landlord)
Kurihara Ryoichi against Liberal 0 Mie journalist (political)
Shigeoka Kungoro against Liberal 0 Ehime politician (lawer)
Horiuchi Kashikuro against Liberal 0 Nagano business (landlord)
Takahashi Anji against Liberal 0 Saitama lawyer
Tanaka Ichibeye against Business 0 Osaka business (merchant)
Matsuo Kanzo against Business 0 Saga business (entrepreneur)
Kosaka Zennnosuke against Business 0 Nagano business (landlord)
Amano Izaemon against Progressive 1 Aichi business (merchant)
Taguchi Ukichi against Progressive 1 Tokyo journalist (economist)
Wada Hikojiro against People 0 Hiroshima business (landlord)
Motoda Hajime against People 0 Oita politician (lawer)
Takada Sanae for Progressive 1 Saitama education
Abe Okindo for Progressive 1 Tokushima business (entrepreneur)
Hamaguchi Kichiemon for Progressive 1 Wakayama business (merchant)
Shimada Takayuki for Progressive 1 Toyama politician
Nakano Buei for Progressive 1 Tokyo business (Stock Exch.)
Fujita Tatsuyoshi for Progressive 1 Ehime business (merchant)
Higashio Heitaro for Progressive 1 Osaka business (landlord)
Nakamura Kokusho for New-Liberal 1 Kanagawa business (merchant)
Kawarabayashi Yoshio for Liberal 0 Kyoto business (rice trader)
Komatsu Sansei for Liberal 0 Kochi journalist
Tsutsumi Michihisa for National 1 Fukuoka bureaucrat (police officer)
Kashiwada Morifumi for Assembly 1 Kagoshima politician
Kawashima Jun for Assembly 1 Kagoshima bureaucrat (MOFA, MOF)
Inoue Kakugoro for independent 1 hiroshima business (entrepreneur)
Sources: House of Representatives and House of Peers, Gikai Seido Nanaju Nen Shi 
[Seventy Years History of Parliamentary System], 1961. House of Representatives, "Minutes of Committes," 
Official Gazette. Nihon Jinmei Daijiten [Japan Who's Who], Kodansha, 2001. Concise Biographic
Encyclopedia: Japanese Issue, Sanseido, 1976. Ooue, Shiro ed., Meiji Obituary, 1935, reprited by
Tokyo Bijutsu, 1971.
Notes: Private-sector-oriented parties are the Liberal Party, Businessmen's Club, People's Association, Progressive party, 
and New Liberal Party (which was separated from Liberal Party). Government oriented parties are 
Assembly Members Club and Nationalist Club. Progressive Party and New Liberal Party were private-sector
oriented, but joined a strategic alliance with the ruling government in 1897.  
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Public-sector Profession  0.00  
 0.74  
    
Political Party  1.93 *** 
 0.61  
    
Silk District  -0.19  
 -0.24  
    
Constant -0.92 * 






Pseudo R-squared  0.35  
Prob > Chi-squared  0.01  
 
Notes: Probit regression where unity equals a vote by a committee member in favor of referring the gold standard 




















 Table 4. Selective Japanese Governmnet Bonds traded in the London Market









maturity Total amount (yen) Means of issuing/listing
9% Foreign Bond (sterling) 1870 9 98 1882 4,880,000 indirect subscription
7% Foreign Bond (sterling) 1873 7 92.5 1897 11,712,000 indirect subscription
Consolidated Public Loan Bond 1896 5 - 1950 -
quotation of domestic bond on 
London Stock Exchange
War Loan Bond 1897 5 99.9 1950 43,000,000 resale of domestic bond
First 4% Sterling Bond 1899 4 90 1953 97,630,000 indirect subscription
Sources: Ouchi, Hyoue, Nihon Zaisei Ron: Kousai Hen (Japanese Public Finance: Public Debts), Kaizo-sha, 1932; Ministry of Finance ed., 













 Table 5: The Effects of Monetary Standards on Japanese Exports, 1877-1912 
  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
Independent Variables PaperSilver  Base SilverSilver  Base 
SilverSilver 2.482***   
 (0.93)   
GoldGold 2.335**  0.242 
 (1.15)  (1.08) 
PaperPaper 2.267***  -1.388 
 (0.84)  (1.07) 
SilverGold 2.262***  -0.17 
 (0.79)  (0.49) 
SilverPaper 0.583  -1.793*** 
 (0.93)  (0.67) 
GoldPaper 2.424**  0.298 
 (1.24)  (1.18) 
GoldSilver 2.788**  0.587 
 (1.23)  (1.12) 
PaperBimetallic 1.737*  -1.899 
 (1.05)  (1.25) 
PaperGold 2.641***  -0.88 
 (0.68)  (0.92) 
PaperSilver   -4.807*** 
   (1.07) 
MFN 0.85  0.791 
 (0.55)  (0.53) 
Railroad 0.093  0.0515 
 (0.08)  (0.08) 
Population -0.489**  -0.306 
 (0.22)  (0.22) 
War -2.345  -2.337 
 (1.65)  (1.63) 
War(-1) 0.983  0.982 
 (2.07)  (2.05) 
War(-2) -1.429  -1.424 
 (2.36)  (2.34) 
War(-3) 0.318  0.982 
 (2.39)  (2.05) 
War(-4) -1.253  -1.231 
 2.34    (2.32) 
War(-5) 0.047  0.063 
 (2.07)  (2.05) 
War(-6) -2.001  -1.409 
 (0.86)  (1.61) 
Year Dummies  YES  YES 
Observations 801  801 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 5
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Figure  6
































































































































































































































Japan joins gold standard  Statistical Appendix: Zivot-Andrews Structural Break Tests, 1887-1910 
Panel A: Interest Rates          
  Consolidated Loan    War Loan   
Break Test Minimum  T-test Break  Date Minimum  T-test Break  Date 
Intercept  -2.665  1897/6 -2.511 1897/6 
Trend  -2.933  1907/1 -3.356 1908/3 
Intercept and Trend  -3.346  1906/12  -3.884  1907/12 
Observations 275  275  175  175 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
        
        
Panel A: Yield Spreads          
  Consolidated Loan    War Loan   
Break Test Minimum  T-test Break  Date Minimum  T-test Break  Date 
Intercept -3.024  1894/6  -2.574  1895/12 
Trend  -3.074  1907/1 -3.685 1908/3 
Intercept and Trend  -3.199  1907/1  -4.741  1907/12 
Observations 275  275  175  175 
 